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Directives, expressives, andmotivation
Toru Suzuki
Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney
When an agent’s motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the
agent’s competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational
and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the
supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent’s ability only by being un-
clear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., “directives,” could reveal the
supervisor’s “distrust” and reduce the agent’s equilibrium effort level even though
it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an
equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is
shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-
edged swords.
Keywords. Communication games, directives, expressives, economics and lan-
guage.
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1. Introduction
Consider a manager who tells a worker what to do for every single task. Even if the man-
ager’s message can resolve uncertainty about the decision environment, such a message
could have an adverse effect on the worker’s motivation when it sounds disrespectful.
Words could convey the speaker’s attitude toward the listener, i.e., expressive content,
and affect the listener’s decision in practice. In fact, the importance of such a psycho-
logical effect of words has been known for a long time: in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, such an
effect—pathos—is treated as one of the most important forces of words. The purpose of
this paper is to analyze the trade-off between the informational and expressive contents
of messages in a simple communication game.
This paper focuses on a communication problem between a supervisor (she) and an
agent (he) that is applicable to manager–worker, teacher–student, and parent–children
communications. The agent has two decisions to make: choosing (i) what to do and (ii)
how much effort to put in. The agent is most productive when what he does matches
the state of nature. Both the supervisor and the agent prefer higher output while the
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agent also takes into account the disutility of effort. The supervisor who does not know
whether the agent knows the state sends a costless message to the agent.
Note that there is no conflict of interest in communicating about the state. Thus,
with the standard assumption that payoffs depend only on the action and the state, the
only relevant thing to communicate is the state. As a result, the supervisor commu-
nicates efficiently about the state in the most natural equilibrium of the game, that is,
she suggests what to do. However, the supervisor’s problem becomes nontrivial if the
expressive content of the message could affect the agent’s action. Specifically, suppose
that making additional effort becomes more painful for the agent if he feels the super-
visor’s distrust in his ability. The supervisor then has to take into account how the agent
could interpret the expressive content of her message in equilibrium.
I analyze the communication problem as a cheap talk game in two dimensions. The
agent is either competent or incompetent depending on whether he can observe the
state of nature. The supervisor who does not know the agent’s competence sends a mes-
sage given the state and her belief about the agent’s competence. The agent who does
not know the supervisor’s belief about his competence updates his belief about the su-
pervisor’s belief given her message. If the agent is incompetent, he also updates his
belief about the state given her message. The agent then makes decisions based on his
updated belief.
To analyze the game, this paper employs two useful concepts, directives and expres-
sives in philosophy of language. A directive message reveals the true state and induces
the right action; an expressive message expresses the supervisor’s belief about the agent
and could affect the agent’s “motivation.” In this paper, whether a message is directive
(expressive) is determined in equilibrium; this approach allows a message to be both
directive and expressive.
The game has an equilibrium in which the supervisor always uses a directive mes-
sage as in the standard setting. However, since the supervisor has an incentive to pre-
tend that she trusts the agent’s ability, a question is whether she can credibly express her
belief about the agent’s competence in equilibrium. It is shown that such an “expressive
equilibrium” always has a handicapping property; that is, the supervisor who trusts the
agent’s ability always communicates inefficiently about the state to express her trust.
In other words, whenever the supervisor credibly communicates her belief about the
agent’s ability, she needs to sacrifice informativeness about the state.
Since the supervisor has various ways to handicap herself in the two-dimensional
communication, many kinds of expressive equilibria can exist. To provide further in-
sights, I focus on expressive equilibria with some degree of consistency in expressive
content; that is, whether the expressive content of a message is more positive than that
of another message does not depend on the receiver’s competence. Intuitively, in these
equilibria, when a message means trust for the competent agent, the message does not
mean distrust for the incompetent agent. This consistency property is appealing if we
consider the use of a natural language; when the supervisor uses messages so that the
equilibrium meaning respects the preexisting meaning to some degree, the equilibrium
possesses the consistency property. It is shown that any directive message has negative
expressive content in any expressive equilibrium with the consistency property. The
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result might explain why directives could sound offensive in ordinary communication
even though more information about the decision environment should not be harmful
to the decision maker.
Since there is no conflict of interest in communicating about the state, the main
purpose of inefficient communication seems to be to express trust. Thus, I consider
expressive equilibria in which whenever the supervisor communicates about the state
inefficiently, the purpose is purely expressive; that is, the use of the messages does not
depend on the state. To characterize such state-independent expressive equilibria, I
introduce an intuitive communication strategy called simple expressive: the supervisor
uses directives when her trust in the agent’s ability is lower than a certain level while
her message is uninformative about the state if the level of her trust is higher. I show
that any state-independent expressive equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to a simple ex-
pressive equilibrium. I also provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a sim-
ple expressive equilibrium; a simple expressive equilibrium exists whenever the agent’s
choice of what to do is sufficiently important and difficult. Intuitively, the condition
guarantees that the supervisor can effectively handicap herself to make her expressive
message credible.
While directives have negative expressive content in natural expressive equilibria,
there also exists an equilibrium that consists entirely of “pure directives,” which have
no expressive content. However, introspection suggests that the equilibrium with pure
directives might not be so stable. Suppose that the supervisor says “I trust you” in an or-
ganization where the use of pure directives is their convention. If this message could ef-
fectively handicap herself by inducing an suboptimal choice, it might be able to convey
her trust overriding the equilibrium. To investigate this observation formally, I employ
the concept of neologism-proof equilibrium. It is shown that whenever a simple expres-
sive equilibrium exists, the equilibrium that consists entirely of pure directives is not
neologism-proof. Moreover, simple expressive equilibria are neologism-proof whenever
the agent’s payoff function is not too sensitive to the supervisor’s trust in the agent’s abil-
ity. Thus, neologism proofness favors simple expressive equilibria over those with pure
directives.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on economics and lan-
guage, especially pragmatics in economic contexts.1  Rubinstein (2000) and Glazer and
Rubinstein (2001, 2006) analyzed a persuasion problem by extending the idea of Grice
(1989) to a noncooperative situation. In their models, the speaker’s statement is verifi-
able, and the listener chooses a persuasion rule that specifies how the listener responds
to each statement. The optimal persuasion rule is then determined as the solution of
the listener’s optimization problem. Since the optimal persuasion rule implicitly cap-
tures how the listener interprets each statement, their approach essentially pins down
the meaning of statements in the noncooperative context. The current paper, on the
other hand, analyzes an advising problem in which the supervisor has to manage not
only the informational but also the expressive content of a message to maximize the
agent’s output. Since the supervisor’s trust is private information and unverifiable, my
1Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that analyzes uses of language.
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model belongs to a class of cheap talk games introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982),
and the main interest is in the trade-off between the informational and expressive con-
tents of a message. Thus, the relevant concept in pragmatics is different from Glazer and
Rubinstein’s.
This paper borrows two useful concepts—directives and expressives—from prag-
matics. These concepts were originally introduced by Searle (1975) to classify effects of
utterances a speaker intends, i.e., “illocutionary acts.”2 A directive message is an utter-
ance that intends to suggest or order a certain action; an expressive message is an utter-
ance that intends to express the speaker’s feeling or attitude. Importantly, the speaker’s
intended meaning of a sentence does not always coincide with the literal meaning but it
is determined by the use of the sentence given a context. Thus, the current paper defines
directives and expressives as properties of a communication strategy so that whether a
message is directive or/and expressive is determined in equilibrium. The distinction
between directives and expressives is useful since their roles are different in this model:
a directive message resolves uncertainty of decision environments while an expressive
message communicates about the supervisor’s attitude and affects the agent’s motiva-
tion.
Another topic that is closely related to my paper is politeness. One of the major
approaches to understanding politeness in communication is based on “face-saving”
by Brown and Levinson (1987). According to the theory, some politeness is intended
to avoid “face-threatening acts.” For example, a sensible speaker knows that a direc-
tive message could threaten a listener’s face and so avoids it or uses an indirect expres-
sion. If the agent’s belief about how the supervisor views the agent’s competence is a
proxy for “face,” the current paper can be interpreted as a communication game with
face-saving. Unlike the original approach, which relies on introspection to identify face-
threatening acts, my approach explains the conditions under which directives could be
face-threatening in equilibrium.
The idea that the sender’s private information interferes with “factual language” is
similar to Blume and Board (2013). In their model, the sender’s set of available messages
depends on his language type. Since the sender’s language type is private information,
and his message reflects not only the state but also his language type, the sender can-
not communicate about the state efficiently even in the common interest game. In the
current paper, the sender’s private information is her belief about the receiver’s compe-
tence. Thus, the fact that the supervisor uses a directive message could reveal her dis-
trust in the agent’s competence. The difference between the current paper and their pa-
per is not only in the setting but also in the nature of the result. Efficient communication
about the state is precluded in their model whereas it is an equilibrium outcome that can
be susceptible to an intuitive neologism in the current paper. Thus, whether factual lan-
guage emerges as a reasonable prediction depends on the situation in the current paper.
There are also other cheap talk models in which a potentially biased sender tries to com-
municate about the state, e.g., Morris (2001) and Morgan and Stocken (2003). However,
2The term “illocutionary act” was introduced by Austin (1962). Searle (1975) categorized illocutionary
acts into five classes: directives, expressives, commissives, assertives, and declaratives.
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as in Blume and Board (2013), these models preclude efficient communication about
the state.
The basic idea that cheap talk can credibly signal one aspect by sacrificing the other
aspect is similar to Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010). Unlike in their model, the sender
does not “talk down” one aspect to credibly signal the other aspect. Instead, the sender
makes her message credible by being uninformative about the other aspect in the cur-
rent paper; that is, the opacity of a message expresses the supervisor’s trust.
In the current paper, the sender can credibly express her trust since she does not
know the receiver’s type. The idea that multiple receivers make communication infor-
mative is similar to the notion of “mutual discipline” in Farrell and Gibbons (1989). The
difference is that unlike in their model, the two possible receivers in the current paper
have the identical payoff function but they are different only in private information.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature that studies incentive prob-
lems beyond extrinsic motivation. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) analyze how an incentive
scheme should be designed when higher extrinsic incentive could damage the worker’s
intrinsic motivation. This paper, on the other hand, analyzes how the supervisor can
manage the worker’s motivation with cheap talk. In my model, a directive message
could be a double-edged sword: it provides useful information about the decision envi-
ronment while it could also damage the worker’s motivation because of the expressive
content.
2. Model
2.1 Basics
There is a supervisor (she) and an agent (he). Let  be a finite set of states of nature and
let π(ω) be a common prior of ω ∈. The supervisor knows ω whereas the agent may or
may not know ω. Specifically, the agent is either competent or incompetent: the agent
is competent if he knows ω whereas he is incompetent if he does not know ω. The agent
has two decision problems. The first problem is technology choice. In this problem, he
chooses technology a from A = {aω}ω∈ ∪ {a0}, where aω is the optimal technology in
state ω, and a0 is a safe technology. The agent’s second problem is to choose his effort
level e from E = [e e¯] ⊂ + given his technology choice a.
The agent’s output depends on (i) the match between technology a and state ω and
(ii) his effort level e. If the agent chooses the right technology given ω, i.e., a = aω at ω,
then the output given e is y(e), where y : E → +. It is assumed that y(e) is twice differ-
entiable, y ′(e) > 0 and y ′′(e) ≤ 0 for any e ∈ E. If the agent chooses a wrong technology,
i.e., a = aω′ at ω 	= ω′, his productivity is discounted by δ ∈ [01). That is, the output
given e is δy(e). Finally, if the agent chooses the safe technology, i.e., a= a0, the produc-
tivity is discounted by λ ∈ (01), and the output given e is λy(e) independently of ω. It is
assumed that λ > δ so that the productivity is lowest under wrong choices. Let f (eaω)
be the output function that summarizes the above specification.
The supervisor does not know whether the agent is competent. Let p be the su-
pervisor’s prior belief that the agent is competent. That is, p measures the supervisor’s
“trust” in the agent’s competence. The agent does not know how the supervisor thinks
180 Toru Suzuki Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
about his competence. In other words, p is the supervisor’s private information. Assume
that p follows distribution (p) with continuous density ψ(p) and supp(ψ)= P = [01].
Furthermore, p and ω are independent, and  is common knowledge.
The agent’s disutility of effort depends on the supervisor’s trust in the agent’s compe-
tence. Specifically, an additional effort gives him higher disutility if he feels that he is less
likely to be trusted. This might be because it is less enjoyable to work under the supervi-
sor who does not trust the agent’s competence.3 Formally, let c(ep) be the agent’s disu-
tility function, which is twice differentiable in each argument.4 The marginal disutility of
effort is strictly positive and increasing in e given any p, i.e., c1(ep) > 0 and c11(ep) > 0
for any (ep). Moreover, so as to capture the negative effect of distrust on the agent’s
motivation, assume that c12(ep) < 0 for any (ep). Finally, assume c1(e¯1) > y ′(e¯) and
c1(e0) < y ′(e) so that the optimal effort level of the competent agent is in the interior of
E given any belief about p.
The agent’s output is shared by both players, and the supervisor prefers a higher
output level independently of (pω). Specifically, the supervisor’s payoff given (eaω)
is f (eaω). Since the effort is costly for the agent, the agent’s payoff given (eaωp) is
f (eaω)− c(ep).5
The game proceeds as follows: the supervisor observes (pω) and sends message m
from a sufficiently rich set M . Then, given the message and his competence, the agent
chooses technology a ∈A and his effort level e ∈E.
Remark 1. To capture the effect of a message on the agent’s motivation, this paper
assumes that the agent intrinsically cares about the supervisor’s belief as in Bernheim
(1994), Köszegi (2006), and other psychological games.6 Note that a message does not
affect the agent’s disutility directly. Instead, it affects the agent’s payoff through his equi-
librium belief about the supervisor’s opinion. This approach allows us to analyze how
the expressive content of a message depends on the parameters that capture the physi-
cal setting behind the communication.
The belief-dependent payoff can be also interpreted as a reduced form of a dynamic
interaction with the standard payoff function.7 However, since the expressive content of
3In social psychology, Enzle and Anderson (1993) found that surveillance could undermine intrinsic mo-
tivation. Moreover, the effect was more pronounced when the subjects interpreted the surveillance as a
stronger signal of distrust.
4Since the agent does not observe p, c(ep) is the agent’s disutility of e when he knows p hypothetically.
Thus, the agent’s decision making is based on his expected disutility.
5The output is implicitly treated as a nonrivalrous benefit to the supervisor and the agent. However, the
results of this paper are preserved even if the output is a profit, which is allocated to each player according
to a sharing rule.
6In psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. (1989)), payoffs depend on “action beliefs.” As in Bernheim
(1994), payoffs depend on “type beliefs” in the current paper. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce
dynamic psychological games that can incorporate type-belief-dependent payoffs.
7From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, Nature might give us a belief-dependent preference
to deal with complicated social interaction problems under a cognitive constraint.
Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Directives, expressives, and motivation 181
words could affect the listener’s decision even without any future interaction in practice,
the psychological interpretation might be more natural.
2.2 Strategy and equilibrium
The supervisor sends m ∈ M given (pω). The supervisor’s communication strategy is
then a mapping:8
σ : P ×→M
The agent observes private signal h: if he is competent, he observes the true state, i.e.,
h = ω, whereas h = n if he is incompetent. Let H =  ∪ {n}. The agent’s technology
choice function is
a :M ×H →A
Moreover, the agent’s effort choice function is
e :M ×H →E
I employ perfect Bayesian equilibrium to analyze this game. Specifically, first, let
e(mh|a) be the agent’s optimal effort level given (mh) when his technology is a. That
is, e(mh|a) solves
max
e∈E
{∑
ω
f(eaω)μω(ω|mh)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p|mh)dp
}

where μω(ω|mh) and μp(p|mh) are the agent’s posterior beliefs about ω and p, re-
spectively. From the assumptions about y(e) and c(ep), the expected marginal output
is decreasing in e whereas the expected marginal disutility is strictly increasing in e given
any μω and μp. Thus, for any (mh), e(mh|a) is unique given a.
Given {e(mh|a)}a∈A, the agent solves the problem
max
a∈A
{∑
ω
f(e(mh|a)aω)μω(ω|mh)−
∫
p
c(e(mh|a)p)μp(p|mh)dp
}

Since the competent agent knows the true state, his optimal technology choice is
always aω at ω. On the contrary, the incompetent agent could have more than one opti-
mal technology depending on μω. Let a∗(mh) be the agent’s optimal technology choice
function that specifies his choice given (mh). Moreover, let e∗(mh)= e(mh|a∗(mh))
be the optimal effort level given (mh).9
The supervisor with (pω) believes that the agent is competent with probability p.
Thus, her expected payoff from m given strategy σ is
Um(pω)= pf(e∗(mω)a∗(mω)ω)+ (1−p)f (e∗(mn)a∗(mn)ω)
8Since allowing mixed strategies does not add any insight into the results of this paper, we focus on pure
strategies.
9Even when the incompetent agent has more than one optimal technology, the optimal effort level is the
same under any optimal technology.
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Then σ∗(pω) is an equilibrium communication strategy if, for any (pω) ∈ P ×,
Uσ
∗(pω)(pω)≥Um(pω)
for all m ∈M .
Remark 2. Since the competent agent knows ω, some “off-equilibrium message” for
the competent agent can be an “equilibrium message” for the incompetent agent. To
see this, suppose σ(p′ω′) = m′ but σ(pω′′) 	= m′ for any p. If the competent agent
receives m′ at ω′′, he cannot apply Bayes’ rule since there is no p that sends m′ at ω′′. On
the contrary, if the incompetent agent receives m′, he can still apply Bayes’ rule since the
message could be sent by the supervisor with (p′ω′).
3. Equilibrium analysis
Since the supervisor’s payoff function does not directly depend on m, there always exist
equilibria in which the supervisor’s message conveys no information about (pω). This
section analyzes equilibria that reveal some information about (pω).
3.1 Fully directive equilibrium
With payoff functions that do not depend on the other player’s belief, there is no conflict
of interest in the communication. Consequently, the only relevant information for both
players is ω, and the supervisor reveals ω in the most natural equilibrium. Since the
supervisor knows that revealing ω always induces the right technology choice, this is
essentially a directive message. To formalize the notion of directives, let
Pσ(mω)= {p ∈ P : σ(pω)=m}
Given communication strategy σ , m′ ∈ M is directive if there exists ω′ such that
Pσ(m
′ω′) 	= ∅ and Pσ(m′ω) = ∅ for any ω 	= ω′. In short, a message is directive if
the agent can uniquely identify the state when he receives it.
The simplest communication strategy with directives is making a suggestion at every
state independently of p. Formally, a communication strategy is fully directive if, for
each ω, there exists message mω ∈ M such that Pσ(mωω) = P and Pσ(mωω′) = ∅ for
any ω′ 	= ω. Moreover, an equilibrium is a fully directive equilibrium if the supervisor
uses a fully directive strategy. In this equilibrium, each message perfectly reveals state ω
while it is uninformative about p; that is, the directives have no expressive content.
The first result states that the most natural equilibrium under “belief-independent
payoffs” is preserved in this model.
Fact 1. There exists a fully directive equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the supervisor’s payoff is always y(e˜), where
e˜= argmax
e∈E
{
y(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)ψ(p)dp
}

In short, e˜ is the effort level induced by directives without expressive content.
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3.2 Expressive equilibrium
The supervisor always wants the agent to believe that p is high while her payoff func-
tion does not depend on m. Thus, it is not obvious whether the supervisor can credibly
express her trust in the agent’s ability. Given a communication strategy σ , m′ ∈ M is
expressive if Pσ(m′ω) P and Pσ(m′ω) 	=∅ for some ω. In short, an expressive mes-
sage reveals some information about p. An equilibrium is an expressive equilibrium if
some (pω) sends an expressive message. Since this is a cheap talk game, there can
be an expressive equilibrium in which no message can influence the agent’s effort level.
However, such an equilibrium is not interesting as it is payoff-equivalent to some equi-
librium that is pooling in p. Thus, our interest is in expressive equilibria in which the
expressive content of some message influences the agent’s effort. An expressive equi-
librium is influential if there exist pp′ ∈ P such that e(σ(pω)ω) 	= e(σ(p′ω)ω) for
some ω.
Proposition 1. In any influential expressive equilibrium, there exists (p′ω′) ∈ P × 
such that σ(pω′) is not directive for all p ∈ (p′1].
Most proofs are given in the Appendix.
The proposition states that any influential expressive equilibrium involves some in-
efficient communication about the state. The idea is that since the supervisor has an
incentive to exaggerate her trust, she can credibly express her trust only by sacrificing
informativeness about the state. In other words, the supervisor needs to handicap her-
self by communicating inefficiently about the state to express her trust.
The supervisor has various ways to handicap herself in this multidimensional com-
munication. As a result, the use of expressive messages could be complex in some ex-
pressive equilibria; for example, whether the expressive content of a message is positive
or negative could depend on the receiver’s competence. Since such a lack of consistency
in expressive content could make the equilibrium difficult to play, one of the properties
of natural expressive equilibria seems to be some degree of consistency in expressive
content. Specifically, if the expressive content of m′ is more positive than that of m′′ for
the competent agent, the incompetent agent also finds m′ more positive.10
To formalize the property, let ec(mn) be the solution of the problem
max
e∈E
{
y(e)−
∫
c(ep)μp(p|mn)dp
}

That is, this is the optimal effort level when the agent knows ω but his belief about p
conditional on m is the same as the incompetent agent’s. In short, ec(mn) extracts the
effect of the expressive content of m on the incompetent agent’s effort choice. An influ-
ential expressive equilibrium is consistent if, for any equilibrium messages m′ and m′′
such that e(m′ω)≥ e(m′′ω) for some ω, ec(m′ n)≥ ec(m′′ n).
10This property is appealing when we consider the use of a natural language: when messages have preex-
isting meanings, the equilibrium meaning of each message would respect the preexisting meaning to some
degree in the focal equilibrium.
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Lemma 1. In any consistent expressive equilibrium, if σ(p′ω) is not directive, then
σ(pω) is not directive for all p>p′.
To provide intuition, observe that, in any consistent expressive equilibrium, the
competent agent’s effort level is strictly higher than the incompetent agent’s whenever
the supervisor sends an uninformative message. Then, since the supervisor with a low
(high) p believes that the agent is competent with a low (high) probability, the super-
visor’s expected payoff from an uninformative message is increasing in p. On the con-
trary, note that the supervisor’s payoff from a directive message is constant in p. Hence,
the supervisor prefers to send an uninformative message whenever a lower p sends an
uninformative message.
From Lemma 1, if the supervisor with p′ at ω sends a directive message in a con-
sistent expressive equilibrium, the supervisor with p < p′ at ω also sends a directive
message. Hence, if the supervisor sends a directive message and a “nondirective” mes-
sage at ω, the expressive content of the directive message is always negative relative to
that of the nondirective message in the consistent expressive equilibrium.
Corollary 1. In any consistent expressive equilibrium, if σ(p1ω) is directive while
σ(p2ω) is not directive, then e(σ(p1ω)ω) < e(σ(p2ω)ω).
Since there is no conflict of interest in communicating about the state, the only moti-
vation to use a nondirective message seems to be to express her trust. In fact, in ordinary
communication, an expressive sentence such as “I trust you” is often used as a “pure
expressive,” that is, the message does not convey any information about the decision
environment. Let
σ(m)= {ω : σ(pω)=m for some p}
An influential expressive equilibrium is state independent if, for any m ∈ M such that
|σ(m)| > 1, Pσ(mω) = Pσ(mω′) for any ωω′ ∈ . That is, in a state-independent
expressive equilibrium, any nondirective message does not reveal any information
about ω. Clearly, any state-independent expressive equilibrium is a consistent expres-
sive equilibrium.
The next lemma provides the property of state-independent expressive equilibrium:
the supervisor never uses a message that can make the incompetent agent choose a
wrong technology.
Lemma 2. In any state-independent expressive equilibrium, there is no (pω) ∈ P × 
such that a(σ(pω)n)= aω′ 	= aω.
From Proposition 1, the supervisor makes her expressive message credible by hand-
icapping herself. If the supervisor induces the incompetent agent to choose aω′′ at ω′,
the same message induces the right technology at ω′′. Then, since sending the mes-
sage at ω′ is more “costly” than sending it at ω′′, the expressive content of the message
should depend on the state. Thus, in any state-independent expressive equilibrium, the
supervisor never uses a message that can induce a wrong choice.
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Now I introduce an intuitive communication strategy in which the uninformative
message is state independent. In this strategy, the supervisor with a low p uses direc-
tives while the supervisor with a high p sends a message that is uninformative about ω.
Formally, a communication strategy is simple expressive if
σ(pω)=
{
m∅ if p ∈ (pˆ1]
m(ω) if p ∈ [0 pˆ)
wherem(ω) is an injection from to M\{m∅}. In short, m(ω) is a directive message; that
is, if the agent receives m(ω′), he knows that the state is ω′. An equilibrium is a simple
expressive equilibrium if the supervisor uses a simple expressive strategy. In this equi-
librium, the uninformative message m∅ expresses the supervisor’s trust in the agent’s
competence by being completely uninformative about ω. In ordinary communication,
it can be interpreted as an expressive sentence whose literal meaning does not refer to
any state, e.g., “I trust your ability.” On the contrary, all the directive messages have
negative express content; that is, they reveal that p is lower than pˆ.
Proposition 2. Any state-independent expressive equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to a
simple expressive equilibrium.
The logic behind this result is as follows. From Lemma 2, if the supervisor uses a
message at more than one state, the message has to make the incompetent agent choose
the safe technology. Moreover, from the state-independence property, the expressive
message has to be used for all states. Then, from Lemma 1, there exists pˆ such that the
supervisor with p < pˆ sends some directive message at each state while the supervisor
with p > pˆ sends some expressive message that makes the incompetent agent choose
the safe technology. When the supervisor uses a communication strategy that is convex
in p, this is a simple expressive equilibrium with cutoff pˆ. It can be shown that even if
the supervisor uses a strategy that is nonconvex in p, it is payoff-equivalent to the simple
expressive equilibrium with pˆ.
The existence of a simple expressive equilibrium is not guaranteed. To provide a
sufficient condition for the existence of a simple expressive equilibrium, let
e0 = argmax
e∈E
{y(e)− c(e0)}
and
eλ = argmax
e∈E
{
λy(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)ψ(p)dp
}

That is, e0 is the optimal effort level under the right technology when the agent is
completely distrusted. Moreover, eλ is the optimal effort level under the safe technology
when the agent has no information about how the supervisor thinks about him. Let
ωmax ∈ argmaxωπ(ω).
Proposition 3. There exists a simple expressive equilibrium if (1−δ)π(ωmax)+δ≤ λ <
y(e0)/y(eλ). Furthermore, if (1 − δ)π(ωmax) + δ > λ, then there is no simple expressive
equilibrium.
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Intuitively, Proposition 3 states that a simple expressive equilibrium exists if the
technology choice problem is sufficiently “difficult” and “important.” First, if (1 −
δ)π(ωmax) + δ ≤ λ, m∅ induces the incompetent agent to choose the safe technology.
This condition is satisfied when the technology choice problem is sufficiently difficult
given δ and λ. To see this, suppose || = 5. If π(ωmax) = 02, the technology choice
problem is difficult for the incompetent agent since all states are equally likely to hap-
pen. On the contrary, when π(ωmax) = 09, the choice problem is easier since the true
state is very likely to be ωmax. Second, if λ < y(e0)/y(eλ), managing the incompetent
agent’s technology choice is more important than managing the expressive content of
directives. To see this, recall that y(e0) is the output level when the supervisor uses a di-
rective message and the agent thinks that he is completely distrusted. Moreover, λy(eλ)
is the output level when the incompetent agent chooses the safe technology without any
information. Thus, if λ < y(e0)/y(eλ), the loss from inducing the safe technology instead
of the right technology is larger than the loss from being perceived as the worst type, i.e.,
p= 0.
The equilibrium cutoff type is constructed so that the cutoff type’s payoffs from mω
and m∅ are indifferent. Since the cutoff type’s payoffs from mω and m∅ are increasing in
the cutoff, the uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff is not guaranteed. However, it can
be shown that if the disutility function is not so sensitive to p, the equilibrium cutoff is
unique and λ < y(e0)/y(eλ) becomes a necessary condition for the existence of a simple
expressive equilibrium.
The equilibrium effort levels in simple expressive equilibrium depend on the pro-
ductivity of the safe technology, i.e., λ. To provide the comparative statics, suppose that
there exists a unique simple expressive equilibrium outcome. Let e(mh;λ) be the effort
level in the simple expressive equilibrium conditional on (mh) under λ.
Fact 2. Suppose λ′′ > λ′ and that there exists a unique equilibrium cutoff under λ′ and
λ′′. Then e(m∅ω;λ′) > e(m∅ω;λ′′) and e(mωh;λ′) > e(mωh;λ′′) for h= nω.
Fact 2 implies that the expressive content of m∅ and mω is more positive under λ′.
To see this, note that when the safe technology becomes less productive, the supervisor’s
expected payoff from m∅ gets lower whereas it does not affect her expected payoff from
mω. Thus, the lower λ encourages more p to send mω instead of m∅. As a result, the
lower λ increases the equilibrium cutoff type. Then, since m∅ reveals p > pˆ and mω
reveals p< pˆ, the lower λ makes the expressive content of the messages more positive.
A natural question is whether a simple expressive equilibrium is more desirable than
the equilibrium without expressive content, i.e., fully directive equilibrium. This is a
nontrivial question because of the trade-off between informational and expressive con-
tents; fully directive equilibria are more efficient in terms of communication about ω
whereas the expressive message can boost the agent’s effort level in simple expressive
equilibria. The following result provides useful insight into the trade-off.
Fact 3. Suppose there exists a simple expressive equilibrium with cutoff pˆ∗. There exists
p˜ ∈ (pˆ∗1) such that the supervisor with p > p˜ prefers the simple expressive equilibrium
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to a fully directive equilibrium, whereas the supervisor with p< p˜ prefers the fully direc-
tive equilibrium to the simple expressive equilibrium.
To see the idea of Fact 3, note that the supervisor’s payoff from a directive message
in a simple expressive equilibrium is strictly lower than that in a fully directive equilib-
rium because of the negative expressive content. Thus, when the supervisor sends the
directive message, she prefers the fully directive equilibrium to the simple expressive
equilibrium. On the other hand, the competent agent’s output level conditional on m∅
is higher than the output level in the fully directive equilibrium because of the positive
expressive content of m∅. When the agent is incompetent, the output level is lower than
that in the fully directive equilibrium since it induces the safe technology. Thus, if p is
sufficiently high, the supervisor prefers the simple expressive equilibrium whereas the
supervisor with a low p prefers the fully directive equilibrium.
Fact 3 suggests that the supervisor prefers a fully directive equilibrium in the ex ante
stage if the probability of p > p˜ is sufficiently small. However, since p˜ depends on the
distribution of p, it is not clear whether the supervisor prefers one equilibrium to an-
other in general. The following example shows that the supervisor’s favorite equilibrium
can be sensitive to the parameter values of the model.
Example 1. Suppose y(e)= 2e, c(ep)= e2/2−pe and (p) is uniform on P . Moreover,
δ = 0, || = 10, and π(ω) is uniform on . If λ = 02, the supervisor prefers a simple
expressive equilibrium to a fully directive equilibrium in the ex ante stage. Conversely,
she prefers the fully directive equilibrium in the ex ante stage if λ= 06. ♦
As I explained in Fact 2, the expressive content of m∅ is more positive when λ is
lower. On the other hand, since a lower λ increases the equilibrium cutoff type, it re-
duces the ex ante probability of sending m∅. The net effect is not clear in general but, in
the case of Example 1, the first effect dominates the second effect.
The agent’s favorite equilibrium is also sensitive to the specification and the param-
eter values of the model. For example, in the setting of Example 1, the competent agent
always prefers a simple expressive equilibrium to a fully directive equilibrium whereas
the incompetent agent prefers the opposite. Thus, whether the agent prefers one equi-
librium to another in the ex ante stage depends on the agent’s prior belief. Finally, the
supervisor’s favorite equilibrium does not always coincide with the agent’s favorite equi-
librium; for instance, when λ is low in the setting of Example 1, the agent prefers a fully
directive equilibrium whereas the supervisor prefers a simple expressive equilibrium in
the ex ante stage.
Recall that when there is a state that is very likely to happen, i.e., (1−δ)π(ωmax)+δ >
λ, there is no state-independent expressive equilibrium. Thus, an expressive equilib-
rium has to be state dependent under such situations. Unlike in state-independent ex-
pressive equilibria, the supervisor uses a message that can induce a wrong technology
to express p in state-dependent expressive equilibria. The next proposition shows that
an intuitive expressive equilibrium can exist when there is no simple expressive equilib-
rium.
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Proposition 4. Suppose (1− δ)π(ωmax)+ δ > λ. If δ < y(e0)/y(e˜), there exists a consis-
tent expressive equilibrium in which the supervisor uses a communication strategy of the
form
σ(pωmax) = mmax for any p
σ(pω) =
{
mmax if p ∈ (pˆ1]
m(ω) if p ∈ [0 pˆ)
wherem(ω) is an injection from toM\{mmax}.
In this equilibrium, the supervisor sends mmax independently of p in ωmax while she
sends mmax in ω 	= ωmax only if her trust is higher than a certain level. Moreover, as in
simple expressive equilibrium, the supervisor uses a directive message in each ω 	=ωmax
if her trust is lower than a certain level.
Since ωmax is very likely to happen, the incompetent agent chooses aωmax when the
received message is not so informative about ω. As m∅ in a simple expressive equilib-
rium, mmax expresses her trust by communicating inefficiently about ω. In other words,
only the supervisor who strongly believes the agent’s competence can send such an un-
informative message at ω 	= ωmax. Unlike m∅ in simple expressive equilibrium, the ex-
pressive content of mmax depends on ω. In fact, if the competent agent receives mmax at
ωmax, the message has no expressive content, i.e., Pσ(mmaxωmax) = P while it has pos-
itive expressive content Pσ(mmaxω) = (pˆ1] at any ω 	= ωmax. When the incompetent
agent receives mmax, it is not completely uninformative about ω since it is more likely to
be sent at ωmax.
The role of the condition δ < y(e0)/y(e˜) is similar to that of λ < y(e0)/y(eλ) in sim-
ple expressive equilibrium; that is, when this condition is satisfied, inducing a wrong
technology is more damaging than making the agent believe p= 0. When this condition
is violated, the conflict of interest in communication about p is too strong to credibly
express the supervisor’s trust.
Not surprisingly, there can be a state-dependent expressive equilibrium in which
the supervisor uses more than two messages in some states. For example, suppose  =
{123} and ωmax = 1. Then consider the class of strategies
σ(p1) = m1 for any p
σ(p2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
m1 if p ∈ (pˆ21]
m0 if p ∈ (pˆ1 pˆ2]
m2 if p ∈ [0 pˆ1]
σ(p3) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
m1 if p ∈ (pˆ21]
m0 if p ∈ (pˆ1 pˆ2]
m3 if p ∈ [0 pˆ1]
If a(m1 n)= a1 and a(m0 n) = a0, this can be an equilibrium strategy under some situ-
ation. Since m1 can induce a wrong technology at state 2 and state 3, it handicaps the
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supervisor more than m0 when δ is sufficiently small. Then m1 conveys a stronger trust
than m0 in equilibrium.
4. Are the pure directives stable?
In fully directive equilibria, the supervisor can communicate about the state efficiently,
and all the directives are neutral in expressive content, i.e., pure directives. At first
glance, fully directive equilibria seem plausible since there is no conflict of interest in
communicating about the state. However, fully directive equilibria might not be so sta-
ble. Suppose a supervisor works at an organization where using pure directives are the
convention. If she says “I have no suggestion since I trust you,” deviating from the con-
vention, she might be able to convey her trust since the focal meaning of the message
could induce a suboptimal technology and she would handicap herself. Thus, when
the supervisor and the agent happen to share the focal meaning of the off-equilibrium
message, it could override the fully directive equilibrium.
To investigate the above observation, I employ the concept of neologism proofness
introduced by Farrell (1993). The concept is based on the assumption of a preexisting
common language that comes from outside of the game. This assumption makes it pos-
sible that the listener can at least “understand” the meaning of a neologism. A putative
equilibrium is tested according to whether the supervisor can upset the equilibrium by
a credible neologism. To define a credible neologism for this game, suppose that when
the supervisor’s neologism means that her type belongs to D :=Q×Z ⊂ P×, the agent
updates his belief according to Bayes’ rule. That is,
μω(ω
′|Dn) =
⎧⎨
⎩
π(ω′)∑
ω∈Z π(ω)
if ω′ ∈Z
0 if ω′ /∈Z
μp(p
′|Dh) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ψ(p′)∫
p∈Q ψ(p)dp
if p′ ∈Q
0 if p′ /∈Q
for any h. Let UD(pω) be type (pω)’s payoff in which the agent optimally responds
to D based on the above updating rule. The term D is a self-signaling set if (pω) ∈
D, UD(pω) > Uσ
∗(pω)(pω), while UD(pω) ≤ Uσ∗(pω)(pω) if (pω) /∈ D. In other
words, D is self-signaling when it satisfies a fixed point property: the set of (pω) who
are strictly better off by claiming she belongs to D exactly coincides with D given an
equilibrium. An equilibrium is neologism-proof if no self-signaling set exists.
The next result shows that neologism proofness favors simple expressive equilibria
over fully directive equilibria.
Proposition 5. Whenever a simple expressive equilibrium exists, fully directive equilib-
ria are not neologism-proof.
Whenever a simple expressive equilibrium exists, the supervisor can upset fully di-
rective equilibria by a neologism with D= (p′1] ×, where p′ is higher than the cutoff
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type of the simple expressive equilibrium. Intuitively, the neologism expresses her trust
while making it credible by being uninformative about ω. Even if no simple expressive
equilibrium exists, fully directive equilibria can fail to be neologism-proof. In fact, fully
directive equilibria are not neologism-proof whenever the safe choice is the incompe-
tent agent’s optimal choice underπ(ω). Note that this condition is always satisfied when
a simple expressive equilibrium exists.
To rank simple expressive and fully directive equilibria based on neologism proof-
ness, I need to show that simple expressive equilibria can be neologism-proof under
a reasonable condition. It can be shown that if a simple expressive equilibrium is
not neologism-proof, any self-signaling set needs to take the form D = [0 q) × {ω},
where q > pˆ∗.11 To obtain further results, I specify the disutility function as c(ep;β)=
C(e) − βb(ep), where β ∈ (01]. One interpretation of this specification is that the
agent’s net disutility of effort c(ep) is determined by his “pain,” i.e., C(e), and his “en-
joyment” that can be enhanced by the supervisor’s trust, i.e., βb(ep). Then assume
that C : E → + is twice differentiable and strictly convex whereas b : E × P → + is
twice differentiable in each argument and b1(ep) > 0. Moreover, assume b11(ep)≤ 0,
b12(ep) > 0, and C ′(e)−b1(ep) > 0 for any (ep) so that the assumptions about c(ep)
in Section 2 are guaranteed under any β ∈ (01]. The following result states that a sim-
ple expressive equilibrium is neologism-proof if the marginal disutility of effort is suffi-
ciently insensitive to p.
Proposition 6. Ifβ is sufficiently small, any simple expressive equilibrium is neologism-
proof.
The idea of Proposition 6 is as follows. As I mentioned earlier, whenever a credible
neologism exists, the self-signaling set takes the form of [0 q)× {ω}, where q > pˆ∗. Note
that the supervisor’s payoff from D = [0 q) × {ω} with q = pˆ∗ is the same as the cutoff
type’s payoff in the simple expressive equilibrium with pˆ∗. When β is lower, the agent’s
effort becomes less sensitive to q. Then, since the supervisor’s payoff from m∅ is strictly
increasing in p, the neologism with any q > pˆ∗ cannot be more attractive than sending
m∅ in the simple expressive equilibrium. How small is “sufficiently small” when a sim-
ple expressive equilibrium is neologism-proof? The next result shows that the condition
in Proposition 6 can be quite mild.
Fact 4. Suppose(p) is a uniform distribution on [01], y(e)= αe, and c(ep)= e2/2−
βpe, where α> β> 0. There exists a simple expressive equilibrium if (1−δ)π(ωmax)+δ≤
λ and β < 2(1 − λ2)α/λ. Moreover, whenever a simple expressive equilibrium exists, it is
neologism-proof.
Fact 4 says that whenever β supports a simple expressive equilibrium in the
linear-quadratic-uniform setting, it is always small enough to make the equilibrium
neologism-proof.
11For more details, see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
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When there are multiple simple expressive equilibrium outcomes, only those with
the highest cutoff can be neologism-proof.12 The idea of this result is as follows. If there
is another simple expressive equilibrium with a higher cutoff type, the supervisor’s ex-
pected payoff from neologism [0 q)× {ω} is sensitive to q. As a result, a higher q makes
the payoff from the neologism higher than type q’s equilibrium payoff. Since type q’s
equilibrium payoff becomes higher than that from the neologism as q goes to 1, there
exists q that makes [0 q)× {ω} a self-signaling set. Note that this result does not contra-
dict Proposition 6; there exists a unique simple expressive equilibrium outcome if β is
sufficiently low.
Remark 3. While neologism proofness turned out to be effective to rank the two impor-
tant equilibria, the fixed point property of self-signaling sets makes obtaining more gen-
eral results difficult. To see this, consider any consistent expressive equilibrium. While
neologism [0 q) × {ω} is a typical candidate for a credible neologism, whether it can
be a self-signaling set or not depends on the sensitivity of the disutility function to p;
that is, it is a quantitative question that depends on the specification and the parameter
values of the model. A disutility function that is less sensitive to p can make such a ne-
ologism noncredible. However, the class of expressive equilibria could fail to exist when
a disutility function becomes less sensitive to p.
5. Discussion
5.1 Two-way communication
This paper focuses on one-way communication. The setting captures a situation where
there is a formal or informal rule that does not allow the agent to speak first. Another
interpretation is that the agent has no incentive to reveal his type because of some factor
that is not in the model. For example, suppose the supervisor could replace the agent
before the task if she knows the agent is incompetent. Then, since the incompetent
agent has no incentive to reveal his type, we can analyze the communication problem
as one-way communication without loss of generality.
However, one might ask how the nature of communication could be changed if the
agent can speak first, i.e., two-way communication. To investigate the question, the as-
sumption of “belief-dependent disutility” needs to be clarified for two-way communi-
cation since the supervisor could update her belief based on the agent’s message. Recall
that the assumption is based on the idea that distrust reduces motivation. However,
when the agent voluntarily reveals his competence in equilibrium, there is no room for
distrust. Thus, if the agent claims that he is incompetent, it should not be offensive
that the supervisor perceives the agent as incompetent. Hence, it seems natural to stay
with the assumption that the agent’s disutility depends on the supervisor’s prior p, i.e.,
her personal view about the agent’s competence, rather than her posterior belief that is
based on the agent’s message.
First, consider a communication protocol that forces the agent to speak first. Specif-
ically, in the first stage, the agent sends a costless message about his competence to the
12See the Appendix for the proof of this result.
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supervisor. In the second stage, the supervisor sends m ∈ M given the agent’s message
and (pω). In the third stage, the agent makes decisions given m, and the game ends.
Since the agent’s cheap talk in the first stage can be ignored, this setting expands the
set of equilibria in the basic setting. However, this setting has a notable feature: there
is a neologism-proof equilibrium that is payoff-equivalent to a fully directive equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, the agent’s message reveals his competence, and the super-
visor sends a directive message only if the agent is incompetent. Since the supervisor
learns the agent’s competence in the first stage, the supervisor has no room to use a
neologism to upset the equilibrium.
Whether the supervisor prefers the above two-way communication protocol to the
one-way communication in the basic setting is not clear. Note that Example 1 shows
that whether the supervisor prefers a fully directive equilibrium to a simple expressive
equilibrium in the ex ante stage depends on the parameter values. Moreover, even in
the case in which the supervisor prefers a fully directive equilibrium in the ex ante stage,
Fact 3 shows that the supervisor with p > p˜ always prefers a simple expressive equilib-
rium in the interim stage. In other words, the supervisor with a high p might try to signal
her trust by refusing the two-way communication and speaking one-directionally. This
observation calls for the following “turn-taking” model.
Suppose that the supervisor decides the communication protocol given (pω), and
the agent can speak only if the supervisor allows it. The other aspects of the model is the
same as in the basic setting.
• Stage 1. The supervisor chooses either sending a message one-directionally or
letting the agent speak first. Formally, her strategy is σ1 : P ×→M ∪ {ask}.
• Stage 2.
– If σ1(pω) = m, then the agent chooses actions (a e) and the game ends; that
is, it is the same as in the basic setting.
– Ifσ1(pω)= ask, the agent reports his competence r ∈ {CI}; that is, his strategy
is r : T → {CI}. Then the game moves to Stage 3.
• Stage 3. The supervisor chooses m ∈M ; that is, her strategy is σ2 : P××{CI} →
M .
• Stage 4. Given message m, the agent chooses actions (a e) and the game ends.
Interestingly, this two-way communication game has equilibria that are analogous to
those in the original one-way communication game.
Fact 5. Whenever a simple expressive equilibrium exists in the basic setting, there exists
an equilibrium in which
σ1(pω) =
{
m∅ if p> pˆ∗
ask if p< pˆ∗
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r(t) =
{
C if t = C
I if t = I
σ2(pω r) =
{
m(ω) if r = I
m∅ if r = C
where pˆ∗ is the cutoff type of the simple expressive equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium
is payoff-equivalent to the simple expressive equilibrium in the basic game.
Note that when p > pˆ∗, the agent’s belief conditional on m∅ is the same as that in
the simple expressive equilibrium with cutoff pˆ∗. Thus, the supervisor’s payoff from m∅
is the same as that in the simple expressive equilibrium. On the other hand, if p < pˆ∗,
she asks the agent’s type and gives advice on request. However, since her turn-taking
decision reveals her distrust, i.e., p < pˆ∗, and the agent knows ω in the final stage, the
agent’s decision is the same as the case in which he receives a directive message in the
simple expressive equilibrium. Thus, this equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to the sim-
ple expressive equilibrium. Intuitively, the fact that the supervisor questions the agent’s
competence reveals her distrust while the supervisor can express her trust by not asking
any question.
There also exists an equilibrium that is payoff-equivalent to a fully directive equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, the supervisor asks about the agent’s competence indepen-
dently of her type; the agent truthfully reports his competence; the supervisor sends a
directive message only if the agent is incompetent. However, this equilibrium suffers
from the same problem as fully directive equilibrium in the basic setting: this is not
neologism-proof whenever a simple expressive equilibrium exists. Thus, if we consider
two-way communication in which the supervisor is not a passive communicator, the ba-
sic nature of the model goes back to the original setting; that is, the basic setting provides
useful insight into two-way communication.
5.2 A related signaling game and the D1 equilibrium
Section 4 demonstrated that neologism proofness favors simple expressive equilibria
over fully directive equilibria. One might think that the instability of pure directives
could be the product of neologism-proof equilibrium, which is known to be a strin-
gent criterion. I claim that as long as the supervisor can handicap herself with an off-
equilibrium message, we can obtain the analogous result even under a different type of
off-equilibrium belief restriction.
To see the claim, suppose M = A. Since there is no conflict of interest in commu-
nication about ω, suppose that the incompetent’s choice function is restricted so that
a(mn)=m. This restriction transforms the current model into a costly signaling model
with single type p. As a result, some equilibrium dominance-based refinement becomes
effective. In the Appendix, it is shown that the fully directive equilibrium fails the D1 cri-
terion whenever the simple expressive equilibrium exists. Since the simple expressive
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equilibrium always passes the test, the result is analogous to that with neologism-proof
equilibrium.13
5.3 Misunderstanding
In equilibrium, there is no misunderstanding about the expressive content of directives.
However, in reality, we often suffer from misunderstanding in expressive content. For
example, when the supervisor says “Choose technology 1,” the agent could interpret
the message with negative expressive content even if the supervisor does not intend
it. In fact, linguistic philosophers treat a speaker’s intended effect of her utterance, i.e.,
illocutionary force, and the actual effect, i.e., the perlocutionary effect, separately.
One way to deal with the gap between the speaker’s intention and the listener’s in-
terpretation might be to incorporate some naive/sincere types who use words literally
as Chen (2011). Another approach might be to incorporate “language competence” as
do Blume and Board (2013). Their approach is to introduce “language type” that deter-
mines the set of messages one can send and understand. However, since the relevant
language competence here is not in the ability to send or identify messages but “to play
equilibrium,” it could be challenging to extend their approach.
6. Concluding remarks
Since the expressive content of words could affect economic decisions, it is important to
understand how the expressive content could emerge in an economic context. This pa-
per provided a game theoretical framework to investigate how a seemingly uninforma-
tive message could have positive expressive content while directives could have negative
expressive content. It is also shown that pure directives are susceptible to an intuitive
neologism whenever an expressive equilibrium exists.
Even though the model of this paper is built on a psychological setting, i.e., the
belief-dependent payoff, the idea of the trade-off between expressives and directives can
be applicable to standard settings. For example, consider a situation in which a worker
needs to choose his effort level for a task but it also has an aspect of relationship-specific
investment. Since the agent’s investment decision could depend on how the supervisor
thinks about the agent’s ability, the manager might need to balance the informational
and expressive contents of her directives.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let Uω(p) be the supervisor’s payoff at ω given p in an equilibrium, that is,
Uω(p)= py(e(σ(pω)ω))+ (1−p)f (a(σ(pω)n) e(σ(pω)n)ω)
First, I establish the following lemma.
13I appreciate one of the referees for motivating this observation.
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Lemma 3. The function Uω(p) is a piecewise linear convex function.
Proof. First, I claim that Uω(p) is a continuous function. Clearly, Uω(p) is contin-
uous at p′ if p′ ∈ int(Pσ(σ(p′ω)ω)). So suppose p′ ∈ ∂Pσ(m′ω) and that Uω(p) is
discontinuous at p′, that is, Uω(p′) 	= limp→p′ Uω(p). Let Um(pω) be type p’s pay-
off from equilibrium message m at ω in the equilibrium. Note that given any p˜ ∈ P ,
limp→p˜ Uσ(p˜ω)(pω) = Uω(p˜). Thus, if Uω(p′) > limp→p′ Uω(p), Uσ(p′ω)(p′′ω) >
Uω(p
′′) for some p′′ /∈ Pσ(σ(p′ω)ω) such that p′ ∈ ∂Pσ(σ(p′′ω)ω) and that is close
to p′. But then p′′ has an incentive to send m′. On the other hand, if Uω(p′) <
limp→p′ Uω(p), p′ has an incentive to imitate some p /∈ Pσ(σ(p′ω)ω) such that p′ ∈
∂Pσ(σ(pω)ω) and that is close to p′. Thus, Uω(p) is continuous in p.
Second, Uω(p) is piecewise linear since, for any p ∈ Pσ(mω), U ′ω(p;m) = y(e(m
ω))− f (e(mn)a(mn)ω), which is constant in p ∈ Pσ(mω), and Pσ(mω) is a parti-
tion of P .
Finally, since Uω(p) is piecewise linear and continuous, it suffices to show that
U ′ω(p) is weakly increasing to complete the proof. Suppose U ′ω(p) is not weakly in-
creasing. Then, since the function is continuous and piecewise linear, there exist
(p0p1p2) such that (i) p1 <p0 <p2, (ii) p0 ∈ ∂Pσ(σ(p1ω)ω)∩∂Pσ(σ(p2ω)ω), and
(iii) kσ(σ(p2ω)ω) < kσ(σ(p1ω)ω). Observe that
Um
′′
(p2ω) = Um′′(p0ω)+
∫ p2
p0
kσ(m
′′ω)dp
Um
′
(p2ω) = Um′(p0ω)+
∫ p2
p0
kσ(m
′ω)dp
where m′ = σ(p1ω) and m′′ = σ(p2ω). Since Um′(p0ω) = Um′′(p0ω), Um′(p2ω) >
Um
′′
(p2ω) if kσ(m′′ω) < kσ(m′ω). But then p′′ strictly prefers m′ to m′′, a contradic-
tion. 
The proof of Proposition 1 consists of three steps.
Step 1. If e(m′ω1) < e(m′ n) in an influential expressive equilibrium, there exists
ω2 	=ω1 such that e(m′ω2) > e(m′ n). Let σ(m)= {ω : σ(pω)=m for some p}. Note
that
μp(p|mn)=
∑
ω∈σ(m)
μp(p|mω)πσ(ω|m)
where πσ(ω|m) = π(ω)/∑ω˜∈σ(m) π(ω˜). Since e(m′ω1) < e(m′ n) while y(e) is con-
cave and y ′(e) ≥ f1(eaω) given any a and ω, the incompetent agent’s expected
marginal disutility from e(m′ n) conditional on m′ needs to be lower than the compe-
tent’s, that is,∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)
∑
ω∈σ(m)
μp(p|mω)πσ(ω|m)dp≤
∫
p
c1(e(m
′ω1)p)μp(p|mω1)dp
Since c1(ep) > 0 given any p and e(m′ω1) < e(m′ n), the competent agent’s ex-
pected marginal disutility from e(m′ω1) is strictly lower than that from e(m′ n), that
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is, ∫
p
c1(e(m
′ω1)p)μp(p|mω1)dp <
∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)μp(p|mω1)dp
From the above two inequalities,∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)
∑
ω∈σ(m)
μp(p|mω)πσ(ω|m)dp<
∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)μp(p|mω1)dp
Since ω1 ∈σ(m), there must exist ω2 ∈σ(m) such that∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)
∑
ω∈σ(m)
μp(p|mω)πσ(ω|m)dp>
∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)μp(p|mω2)dp
Then, since f1(e(m′ n)a(m′ n)ω2)≤ y ′(e(m′ n)),
y ′(e(m′ n)) >
∫
p
c1(e(m
′ n)p)μp(p|m′ω2)dp
Since y(e) is concave and the expected marginal disutility conditional on m′ is strictly
increasing, e(m′ω2) that satisfies the first-order condition has to be strictly higher than
e(m′ n).
Step 2. In any influential expressive equilibrium, U ′ω(p) > 0 for some (pω). Note
that U ′ω(p;m) = y(e(mω)) − f (e(mn)a(mn)ω). If e(σ(pω)ω) > e(σ(pω)n)
for some (pω), then U ′ω(p) > 0 since y(e) ≥ f (eaω) for all e given any a and ω.
On the other hand, from Step 1, if e(σ(pω)ω) < e(σ(pω)n) for some (pω), then
e(σ(pω)ω′) > e(σ(pω)n) for some ω′ 	= ω, and thus U ′ω′(p) > 0. Now suppose
e(σ(pω)ω) = e(σ(pω)n) and U ′ω(p) = 0 for all (pω). Then σ(pω) is directive
for any (pω). If this is an influential equilibrium, e(m′′ω) > e(m′ω) for some m′′ and
m′. However, if both messages are directive, no p prefers m′ to m′′, a contradiction.
Step 3. There exists (p′ω′) such that σ(pω′) is not directive for all p ∈ (p′1]. From
Lemma 3 and Step 2, there exists ω′ such that U ′ω′(1) > 0. Since U
′
ω′(1) 	= 0, σ(1ω′) is
not directive. Then choose p′ so that (p′1] ⊂ Pσ(σ(1ω′)ω′).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let m′ = σ(p′ω′) and m′′ = σ(p′′ω′). Moreover, let Y(mω) (Y(mn)) be the equilib-
rium output of the competent (incompetent) agent, respectively. From the equilibrium
conditions,
p′[Y(m′′ω′)−Y(m′ω′)] + (1−p′)[Y(m′′ n)−Y(m′ n)] ≤ 0
p′′[Y(m′′ω′)−Y(m′ω′)] + (1−p′′)[Y(m′′ n)−Y(m′ n)] ≥ 0
Then, since p′′ > p′, Y(m′′ω′) − Y(m′ω′) ≥ 0 and Y(m′′ n) − Y(m′ n) ≤ 0. From
Y(m′′ω′)−Y(m′ω′)≥ 0, e(m′′ω′)≥ e(m′ω′).
Now, suppose m′′ is directive but m′ is not. Since Y(m′′ n)−Y(m′ n)≤ 0, and y(e)≥
f (eaω) for all e given any a and ω, then e(m′′ n) ≤ e(m′ n). Since m′′ is directive,
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e(m′′ n) = ec(m′′ n). On the other hand, since m′ is not directive, e(m′ n) < ec(m′ n).
But then ec(m′′ n) < ec(m′ n), that is, this is not consistent expressive equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let Mσ(ω) = {m : σ(pω) = m for some p}. In any state-independent expressive equi-
librium, σ(m)= or {ω} for any m ∈Mσ(ω). Thus, if some message makes the incom-
petent agent choose a technology that is optimal at another state, there are two cases.
First, suppose that σ(m) =  for all m ∈ Mσ(ω′). Then if a(mn) = aω′′ for some
m ∈Mσ(ω′), then a(mn)= aω′′ for all m ∈Mσ(ω′). Since this is an influential expressive
equilibrium, e(m′ω′) > e(m′′ω′) for some m′m′′ ∈Mσ(ω′). Then, since μω(ω|m′′ n)=
μω(ω|m′ n) while μp(p|mω′) = μp(p|mn) for m = m′m′′, f (e(m′ n)a(m′ n)ω′) >
f(e(m′′ n)a(m′′ n)ω′). But then no p has an incentive to sends m′′ at ω′, a contradic-
tion.
Second, suppose σ(m) = {ω′} for some m ∈ Mσ(ω′). Then, from Lemma 1, there
exist m′m′′ ∈ Mσ(ω′) such that a(m′ n) = aω′′ , a(m′′ n) = aω′ , and infPσ(m′ω′) =
supPσ(m′′ω′). Since σ(m′) =  and a(m′ n) = aω′′ , Uω′(p) < Uω′′(p) for all p ∈
Pσ(m
′ω′) form the state-independence property. On the other hand, from Lemma 1
and the state-independence property, σ(σ(pω))= {ω} for any p<p′.
I claim that e(σ(pω′)ω′) = e(σ(pω′′)ω′′) for any p < p′. Since p < p′ sends a
directive message, from Lemma 3, e(σ(pω)ω) is constant in p for p < p′. Let eω =
e(σ(pω)ω) for p < pˆ and Mσ(ω;p < pˆ) = {m : σ(pω) = m for some p < pˆ}. Note
that y ′(eω)=Ep[c1(eωp)|Pσ(mω)ω] for any m ∈Mσ(ω;p< pˆ). Thus, we can write
Ep[c1(eωp)|Pσ(m′ω)ω]
=
∑
m∈Mσ(ω;p<pˆ)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω)|p< pˆ)Ep[c1(eωp)|Pσ(mω)ω]
for any m′ ∈Mσ(ω;p< pˆ). Thus,
Ep[c1(eωp)|Pσ(m′ω)ω]
=
∑
m∈Mσ(ω;p<pˆ)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω))
(pˆ)
∫
p∈Pσ(mω)
c1(eωp)
ψ(p)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω)) dp
=
∫
p<pˆ
c1(eωp)
ψ(p)
(pˆ)
dp
Thus, eω = e′, where y ′(e′)=E[c1(e′p)|p< pˆ], that is, eω is independent of ω. Then
Uω′(p)=Uω′′(p) for all p< p′. However, since Uω′(p′) < Uω′′(p′), Uω′′(p) < Uω′′(p′) for
all p<p′ whenever Uω′(p)=Uω′(p′) for all p<p′, violating Lemma 3.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
As I showed in the proof of Lemma 2, in any state-independent expressive equilibrium,
σ(σ(pω)) = {ω} for some (pω). From Proposition 1, there is no influential expres-
sive equilibrium in which all messages are directive. Thus, σ(σ(pω)) =  for some
198 Toru Suzuki Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
(pω). Moreover, since any state-independent expressive equilibrium is a consistent
expressive equilibrium, Lemma 1 implies that if σ(p′ω) is directive, σ(pω) is also di-
rective for any p<p′. Then, from Lemma 2, given a state-independent expressive equi-
librium, there exists pˆ such that σ(pω) is directive if p< pˆ whereas a(σ(pω)ω)= a0
for any p > pˆ. Moreover, by the state-independence property, such pˆ is independent
of ω.
Now I claim that any state-independent expressive equilibrium that is characterized
by pˆ is payoff-equivalent to a simple expressive equilibrium with pˆ. Let σse be a simple
expressive strategy with pˆ, and letUseω (p) be typep’s payoff fromσ
se atωwhen the agent
responds optimally.
To establish the claim, first I show Uω(p) = Useω (p) for p > pˆ. From the state-
independence property, if e(σ(p′ω)ω) ≥ (<)e(σ(p′′ω)ω), then e(σ(p′ω)n) ≥
(<)e(σ(p′′ω)n). Thus, if e(σ(p′ω)ω) > (<)e(σ(p′′ω)ω), then p′′ (p′) imitates p′
(p′′). Hence, e(σ(p′ω)ω)= e(σ(p′′ω)ω) for any p′p′′ > pˆ in the equilibrium. Then
let e′ = e(σ(pω)ω) for p > pˆ, and Mσ(ω;p > pˆ) = {m : σ(pω) = m for some p > pˆ}.
Since y ′(e′)=Ep[c1(e′p)|Pσ(mω)ω] for any m ∈Mσ(ω;p> pˆ), we can write
Ep[c1(e′p)|Pσ(m′ω)ω]
=
∑
m∈Mσ(ω;p>pˆ)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω)|p> pˆ)Ep[c1(e′p)|Pσ(mω)ω]
for any m′ ∈Mσ(ω;p> pˆ). Thus,
Ep[c1(e′p)|Pσ(m′ω)ω]
=
∑
m∈Mσ(ω;p>pˆ)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω))
1−(pˆ)
∫
p∈Pσ(mω)
c1(e
′p) ψ(p)
Pr(p ∈ Pσ(mω)) dp
=
∑
m∈Mσ(ω;p>pˆ)
∫
p∈Pσ(mω)
c1(e
′p) ψ(p)
1−(pˆ) dp
=
∫
p>pˆ
c1(e
′p) ψ(p)
1−(pˆ) dp
Then, since e′ satisfies the first-order condition y ′(e′) = E[c1(e′p)|p > pˆ], e′ =
e(σse(pω)ω) for all p > pˆ. Then, from the state-independence property, Uω(p) =
Useω (p) for p> pˆ.
Now I show Uω(p) = Useω (p) for p < pˆ. As I mentioned earlier, e(σ(p′ω)ω) =
e(σ(p′′ω)ω) for any p′p′′ < pˆ. Let e′′ = e(σ(pω)ω) for p < pˆ and Mσ(ω;p <
pˆ) = {m : σ(pω) = m for some p < pˆ}. Note that y ′(e′′) = Ep[c1(e′′p)|Pσ(mω)]
for any m ∈ Mσ(ω;p < pˆ). Thus, by an argument analogous to the case of p > pˆ,
Ep[c1(e′′p)|Pσ(mω)] = E[c1(e′′p)|p < pˆ] for all m ∈ Mσ(ω;p < pˆ). Then, since e′′
satisfies y ′(e′′) = E[c1(e′′p)|p < pˆ], e′′ = e(σse(pω)ω) for all p < pˆ. Thus, Uω(p) =
Useω (p) for p< pˆ.
Since the case of p= pˆ can be included in either p> pˆ or p< pˆ, Uω(p)=Useω (p) for
all p.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the supervisor uses a simple expressive strategy with cutoff pˆ. Let
e(mh|pˆ) be the optimal effort level given (mh) when the supervisor uses the simple
expressive strategy with pˆ. The type (pω) supervisor’s expected payoff from m∅ is then
Um∅(pω|pˆ)= py(e(m∅ω|pˆ))+ (1−p)f (e(m∅ n|pˆ) a(m∅ n)ω)
Note that the incompetent agent’s expected payoff given a0 and m∅ is
max
e∈E
{
λy(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p|m∅n)dp
}

Moreover, his payoff given aω′ and m∅ is
max
e∈E
{
π(ω′)y(e)+ (1−π(ω′))δy(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p|m∅n)dp
}

Thus, if λ≥ (1−δ)π(ω)+δ for any ω, then a0 is optimal for the incompetent agent given
m∅. The type (pω) supervisor’s expected payoff from m∅ is then
Um∅(pω|pˆ)= py(e(m∅ω|pˆ))+ (1−p)λy(e(m∅ n|pˆ))
Since μω(ω|mωn)= 1, we have e(mωω|pˆ)= e(mωn|pˆ). Thus, the supervisor’s ex-
pected payoff from mω is
Umω(pω|pˆ)= y(e(mωω|pˆ))
Given the simple expressive strategy with pˆ, the supervisor sends m∅ only if p > pˆ.
Thus, the agent’s consistent belief about p conditional on m∅ is
μp(p|m∅h; pˆ)=
{
ψ(p)
1−(pˆ) if p ∈ (pˆ1]
0 if p ∈ [0 pˆ]
for any h. Henceforth, I omit h from μp(p|m∅h; pˆ).
Note that μp(p|m∅; pˆ) is not well defined at pˆ = 1. Then consider the limit
of μp(p|m∅; pˆ) when pˆ approaches 1. Note that supp(μp(·|m∅; pˆ)) = (pˆ1] and
μp(1|m∅; pˆ) > 0 for any pˆ < 1. Thus, as pˆ approaches 1, the only possible type who
sends m∅ becomes p= 1. Thus,
lim
pˆ→1
∫ 1
pˆ
c(ep)μp(p|m∅; pˆ)dp= c(e1)
Then, by the maximum theorem, limpˆ→1Um∅(pˆω|pˆ)= y(e1), where
e1 := argmax
e∈E
{y(e)− c(e1)}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Given the simple expressive strategy with pˆ, the supervisor sends mω only if p ≤ pˆ.
Thus, the agent’s consistent belief about p conditional on mω is
μp(p|mωh; pˆ)=
{
ψ(p)
(pˆ)
if p ∈ [0 pˆ]
0 if p ∈ (pˆ1]
for any h. Henceforth, I omit h from μp(p|mωh; pˆ).
Obviously, limpˆ→1μp(p|mω; pˆ) = μp(p|mω;1) = ψ(p). Then, since a(mωh) = aω
for h=ωn, limpˆ→1Umω(pˆω|pˆ)=Umω(1ω|1)= y(e˜), where
e˜= argmax
e∈E
{
y(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)ψ(p)dp
}

Then, since e1 > e˜,
lim
pˆ→1
Um∅(pˆω|pˆ) > lim
pˆ→1
Umω(pˆω|pˆ)
Turning to the case where pˆ approaches 0, note that limpˆ→0μ(p|m∅; pˆ)= μ(p|m∅;
0)=ψ(p). Then, since m∅ induces the incompetent agent to choose a0, limpˆ→0Um∅(pˆ
ω|pˆ)=Um∅(0ω|0)= λy(eλ), where
eλ = argmax
e
{
λy(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)ψ(p)dp
}

Consider the case of mω. Since μp(p|mω; pˆ) is not well defined at pˆ = 0, we need to
consider the limit of μp(p|mω; pˆ) when pˆ approaches 0. Note that supp(μp(·|mω; pˆ))=
[0 pˆ] and μp(0|mω; pˆ) > 0 for any pˆ > 0. Thus, as pˆ approaches 0, the only possible type
who sends mω becomes p= 0. Hence,
lim
pˆ→0
∫ pˆ
0
c(ep)μp(p|mω; pˆ)dp= c(e0)
Then, by the maximum theorem, limpˆ→0Umω(pˆω|pˆ)= y(e0), where
e0 = argmax
e
{y(e)− c(e0)}
Therefore, if λy(eλ) < y(e0),
lim
pˆ→0
Um∅(pˆω|pˆ) < lim
pˆ→0
Umω(pˆω|pˆ)
Since Um∅(pˆω|pˆ)−Umω(pˆω|pˆ) is continuous in pˆ ∈ (01), there exists at least one
pˆ∗ ∈ (01) such that
Um∅(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗)=Umω(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗)
Given the simple expressive strategy with pˆ∗, Um∅(pω|pˆ∗) is strictly increasing in
p while Umω(pω|pˆ) is constant in p. Hence, Um∅(pω|pˆ∗) > (<)Umω(pω|pˆ∗) if p >
(<)pˆ∗. Thus, this is an equilibrium strategy.
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Finally, suppose that the off-equilibrium beliefs are such that μω(ω|m′ n) = π(ω)
and μp(p|m′ω) = μp(p|m′ n) = ψ(p) for any off-equilibrium message m′. Then no
(pω) has any incentive to deviate.
A.6 Proof of Fact 2
First, I establish the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose λ′′ > λ′. If there exists a unique simple expressive equilibrium out-
come, the equilibrium cutoff pˆ∗ under λ′ is higher than that under λ′′.
Recall that the type (p′ω) supervisor’s expected payoff from m∅ is
Um∅(p′ω|pˆλ)= p′y(e(m∅ω|pˆ))+ (1−p′)λy(e(m∅ n|pˆ))
On the other hand, the supervisor’s expected payoff from sending advice mω is
Umω(p′ω|pˆλ)= y(e(mωω|pˆ))
Note that whenever there exists a unique simple expressive equilibrium outcome, the
equilibrium cutoff type has to be unique. As I showed in the proof of Proposition 3,
limpˆ→1Um∅(pˆω|pˆ) > limpˆ→1Umω(pˆω|pˆ). Then we need to have limpˆ→0Um∅(pˆ
ω|pˆ) < limpˆ→0Umω(pˆω|pˆ) for the uniqueness of the cutoff. Clearly, Um∅(pˆω|pˆλ′′) >
Um∅(pˆω|pˆλ′), while Umω(pˆω|pˆλ′′) = Umω(pˆω|pˆλ′). Then, since Um∅(pˆω|pˆλ)
and Umω(pˆω|pˆλ) are both strictly increasing in pˆ, whereas the uniqueness of the cut-
off type implies that they intersect only once, the cutoff type pˆ∗λ′ such that U
m∅(pˆ∗λ′
ω|pˆ∗λ′λ′) = Umω(pˆ∗λ′ω|pˆ∗λ′λ′) is always higher than pˆ∗λ′′ such that Um∅(pˆ∗λ′′ω|pˆ∗λ′′
λ′)=Umω(pˆ∗λ′′ω|pˆ∗λ′′λ′). This establishes Claim 1.
To prove Fact 2, observe that given a simple expressive strategy with cutoff pˆ∗λ, the
expected marginal disutility conditional on m∅ under λ is∫
p>pˆ∗λ
c1(ep)
ψ(p)
1−(pˆ∗λ)
dp
Since c12(ep) < 0, Claim 1 implies that the expected marginal disutility conditional on
m∅ is higher under λ′′. Then, since the competent agent’s production function is always
y(e), we have e(m∅ω;λ′) > e(m∅ω;λ′′).
On the other hand, given the simple expressive strategy with pˆ∗λ, the expected disu-
tility conditional on mω is ∫
p<pˆ∗λ
c1(ep)
ψ(p)
(pˆ∗λ)
dp
From Claim 1, the expected marginal disutility condition on mω is higher under λ′′.
Since mω reveals the true state, the agent’s production function is always y(e). Thus,
e(mωω;λ′) > e(mωω;λ′′) and e(mωn;λ′) > e(mωn;λ′′).
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A.7 Proof of Fact 3
Let Y(mh) be the output level in a simple expressive equilibrium conditional on m
and h. First, since mω is sent by p < pˆ∗, whereas m∅ is sent by p > pˆ∗, Y(mωω) <
Y(m∅ω). Note that in the equilibrium, mω and m∅ have to be indifferent for the su-
pervisor with (pˆ∗ω). That is,
Y(mωω)= pˆ∗Y(m∅ω)+ (1− pˆ∗)Y(m∅ n)
It follows that Y(m∅n) < Y(mωω) < Y(m∅ω).
Moreover, μp(p|m∅ω) first-order-stochastically dominates ψ(p), while ψ(p) first-
order-stochastically dominates μp(p|mωω). Thus, from c12(ep) < 0, e(m∅ω) > e˜ >
e(mωω). Hence, Y(mωω) < y(e˜) < Y(m∅ω). This implies that there exists p˜ ∈ (pˆ∗1)
such that
p˜Y(m∅ω)+ (1− p˜)Y(m∅ n)= y(e˜)
Note that y(e˜) is the supervisor’s payoff in fully directive equilibrium. Then, if p > p˜,
the supervisor prefers the simple expressive equilibrium to a fully directive equilibrium
while p< p˜ prefers the opposite.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
The basic idea of the proof is analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 3. Suppose
the supervisor uses a strategy in Proposition 4. Clearly, since λ < (1 − δ)π(ωmax) + δ,
a(mmax n)= aωmax given any cutoff pˆ. Let e(mh|pˆ) be the optimal effort level given the
strategy with cutoff pˆ. Note that the type (pω) supervisor’s expected payoff from mmax
is
Ummax(pω|pˆ)= py(e(mmaxω|pˆ))+ (1−p)δy(e(mmax n|pˆ))
if ω 	= ωmax. On the other hand, since mω always reveals the true state, e(mωω|pˆ) =
e(mωn|pˆ). Thus, the supervisor’s expected payoff from mω is
Umω(pω|pˆ)= y(e(mωω|pˆ))
For the competent agent at ω 	= ωmax, his belief about p conditional on mmax is the
same as that conditional on m∅ given a simple expressive strategy with cutoff pˆ. On the
other hand, when the incompetent agent receives mmax, he cannot rule out the possi-
bility of ω = ωmax. Note that this makes his belief about p different from that given a
simple expressive strategy. However, as pˆ goes to 1, the supervisor’s payoff from mmax
is the same as that from m∅ in the proof of Proposition 3. Note that as pˆ goes to 1, the
only p who uses the message in ω 	= ωmax becomes p = 1. That is, μp(p = 1|mmaxω)
converges to 1 if ω 	=ωmax. It implies that the competent agent’s effort level converges to
e1 = argmax{y(e)− c(e1)} as pˆ goes to 1. Moreover, as pˆ goes to 1, the supervisor with pˆ
believes that the agent is competent for sure. Thus, limpˆ→1Ummax(pˆω|pˆ) = y(e1) as in
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the case of m∅ in the proof of Proposition 3. Thus,
lim
pˆ→1
Ummax(pˆω|pˆ) > lim
pˆ→1
Umω(pˆω|pˆ)
for ω 	=ωmax.
If pˆ = 0, the strategy is just a pooling strategy and mmax induces aωmax . Thus,
Ummax(pˆω|pˆ) = δy(e(mmax n|0)) if pˆ = 0 and ω 	= ωmax. Since mmax induces a wrong
technology, e(mmax n|0) < e˜. Moreover, since μp(p = 0|mωh) converges to 1 as pˆ goes
to 0, limpˆ→0Umω(pˆω|pˆ) = y(e0) if ω 	= ωmax. Note that e(mmax n|0) ≤ e˜. Therefore, if
δy(e˜) < y(e0), then
lim
pˆ→0
Ummax(pˆω|pˆ) < lim
pˆ→0
Umω(pˆω|pˆ)
Note that since Ummax(pˆω|pˆ)−Umω(pˆω|pˆ) is continuous in pˆ ∈ (01), there exists
at least one pˆ∗ ∈ (01) such that
Ummax(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗)=Umω(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗)
To see that the strategy with pˆ∗ is an equilibrium strategy, note that Ummax(pω|pˆ∗) is
strictly increasing in p, while Umω(pω|pˆ) is constant in p. Hence, Ummax(pω|pˆ∗) >
(<)Umω(pω|pˆ∗) if p> (<)pˆ∗ for ω 	=ωmax.
Now suppose that the off-equilibrium beliefs are such that μω(ω|m′ n) = π(ω) and
μp(p|m′ω) = μp(p|m′ n) = ψ(p) for any off-equilibrium message m′. Then a(m′ n) =
aωmax . Since μp(p|mmaxh) first-order-stochastically dominates ψ(p), Ummax(pω|pˆ∗)≥
Um
′
(pω|pˆ∗) for any (pω) who sends mmax in the strategy. Moreover, from the equi-
librium condition, Ummax(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗) = Umω(pω|pˆ∗) for any p if ω 	= ωmax. Then, since
Ummax(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗)≥Um′(pω|pˆ∗), any (pω) who sends mω in the strategy has no incen-
tive to send m′.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
The supervisor’s expected payoff in fully directive equilibrium is y(e˜). When the safe
choice is the incompetent agent’s optimal choice given the prior, the expected payoff
from D(pˆ)= (pˆ1] × is
UD(pˆ)(pω)= py(e(D(pˆ)ω))+ (1−p)λy(e(D(pˆ)n))
where e(Dh) is the agent’s best response to D given h. Clearly, y(e˜) > UD(pˆ)(pˆω)
for sufficiently small pˆ whereas UD(pˆ)(pˆω) > y(e˜) for sufficiently large pˆ. Then, since
UD(pˆ)(pω) is strictly increasing and continuous in pˆ, there exists pˆ∗∗ ∈ (pˆ∗1) such that
UD(pˆ
∗∗)(pˆ∗∗ω)= y(e˜). Since UD(pˆ)(pω) is strictly increasing in p, UD(pω) > (<)y(e˜)
if (pω) ∈ (/∈)D. Thus, D= (pˆ∗∗1] × is a self-signaling set.
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A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose there exists a simple expressive equilibrium. Let D = Q×Z ⊂ P × be a self-
signaling set. Moreover, let a(Dh) be the induced technology choice and let e(Dh) be
the induced effort level induced by D given h. That is,
e(Dh)= argmax
e∈E
{∑
ω
f(ea(Dh)ω)μω(ω|Dh)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p|Dh)dp
}

Let UD(pω) denote the supervisor (pω)’s expected payoff from D. First, I establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If a self-signaling set exists for a simple expressive equilibrium, then D =
[0 q)× {ω}, where q > pˆ∗.
To prove the lemma, consider the following three cases.
Case 1: |Z| = 1. Let {ω′} =Z.
Step 1. If p′ ∈ Q and p′ < pˆ∗, [0 pˆ∗) ⊂ Q. Suppose not. Then there exists
p′′ < pˆ∗ such that p′′ /∈ Q. Since D is a self-signaling set, UD(p′ω′) > Umω′ (p′ω′).
Since a(Dh) = aω′ for h = nω′, UD(p′ω′) = UD(p′′ω′), whereas Umω′ (p′ω′) =
Umω′ (p′′ω′)= y(e(mω′ω′)). Therefore, UD(p′′ω′) > Umω(p′′ω′), a contradiction.
Step 2. If p′′ ∈ Q and p′′ > pˆ∗, then (pˆ∗p′′) ⊂ Q. Suppose not. Then there exists
p′ ∈ (pˆ∗p′′) such that p′ /∈Q. Since D is a self-signaling set, UD(p′′ω′) > Um∅(p′′ω′).
Since a(Dh) = aω′ for h = nω′, UD(p′ω′) = UD(p′′ω′). On the other hand, since
Um∅(pω) is strictly increasing in p, Um∅(p′′ω) > Um∅(p′ω). Thus, UD(p′ω′) >
Um∅(p′ω′), a contradiction.
Step 3: Q 	= (pˆ∗p′′) for any p′′ ∈ (pˆ∗1]. Suppose not. Then, for some p′′ ∈ (pˆ∗1],
U∅(pω′) < UD(pω′) for any p ∈ (pˆ∗p′′). Moreover, since a(Dh) = aω′ for any
h, UD(pω′) is constant in p. But since Umω(pω′) = U∅(pˆ∗ω′) for any p ≤ pˆ∗,
Umω(pω′) < UD(pω′) for any p≤ pˆ∗, a contradiction.
From Step 1–3, whenever Z = {ω′}, D= [0 q)× {ω′}, where q≥ pˆ∗.
Now turning to self-signaling sets with |Z|> 1, consider the following two cases.
Case 2: |Z|> 1 and a(Dn)= a0. In this case, the type (pω) supervisor’s expected payoff
given D is UD(pω) = py(e(Dω)) + (1 − p)λy(e(Dn)). Since the agent’s belief about
p given Q is independent of h, e(Dω) > e(Dn). Thus, UD(pω) is strictly increasing
in p.
Step 1. If p′ ∈ Q and p′ > pˆ∗, then (pˆ∗1] ⊂ Q. Suppose p′′ /∈ Q for some p′′ > pˆ∗.
Note that a(Dω) = a(m∅ω) = aω and a(Dn) = a(m∅ n) = a0. Thus, if UD(p′ω) >
Um∅(p′ω), then e(Dh) > e(m∅h) for h = nω. Then we also have UD(p′′ω) >
Um∅(p′′ω), a contradiction.
Step 2: Q 	= (pˆ∗1]. Note that Pσ(m∅ω) = (pˆ∗1] in simple expressive equilib-
rium. Thus, if Q = (pˆ∗1], then e(Dh) = e(m∅h) for h = nω and thus UD(pω) =
Um∅(pω) for any p ∈Q, a contradiction.
Step 3. If p′ ∈Q and p′ <p′′ < pˆ∗, then p′′ ∈Q. Suppose not. Then p′ ∈Q but p′′ /∈Q.
Note that UD(pω) is strictly increasing in p, while Umω(pω) is constant in p. Hence,
UD(p′′ω) > Umω(p′′ω) whenever UD(p′ω) >Umω(p′ω), a contradiction.
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From Steps 1 and 2, if |Z| > 1, a(Dn) = a0 and supQ > pˆ∗, then Q  (pˆ∗1]. Then
Step 3 implies that the only possibility is Q= (p˜1], where p˜ < pˆ∗.
Step 4: Q 	= (p˜1], where p˜ < pˆ∗. Suppose Q = (p˜1]. Then, since p˜ < pˆ∗,
μp(p|m∅h) first-order-stochastically dominates μp(p|Dh) for h = ωn. Then, since
D and m∅ induce the same technology choice given h = nω, e(Dh) < e(m∅h) for
h= nω. But then UD(pω) <Um∅(pω) for p ∈Q, a contradiction.
Step 4 implies that supQ ≤ pˆ∗. From Step 3, if |Z| > 1, a(Dn) = a0, and supQ ≤ pˆ∗,
then the only possibility is Q= (p˜ pˆ∗] or (p˜ pˆ∗), where p˜ ∈ [0 pˆ∗).
Step 5. There is no self-signaling set such that |Z| > 1 and a(Dn) = a0. Let
UD(p˜)(pω) be the expected payoff of (pω) from D when Q = (p˜ pˆ∗] and ω ∈Z. That
is,
UD(p˜)(pω)= py(e(D(p˜)ω))+ (1−p)λy(e(D(p˜)n))
Note that limp˜→pˆ∗ Ep[c(ep)|D(p˜)] = c(e pˆ∗). Then limp˜→pˆ∗ e(D(p˜)h) < e(m∅h)
for h = nω. Hence, limp˜→pˆ∗ UD(p˜)(p˜ω) < Um∅(pˆ∗ω). Note that from the equilib-
rium condition, Um∅(pˆ∗ω) = Umω(pˆ∗ω). Since Umω(pω) = y(e(mωω)) for any
p ∈ [0 pˆ∗], limp˜→pˆ∗ UD(p˜)(p˜ω) < Umω(pω). Then, since UD(p˜)(p˜ω) is strictly in-
creasing in p˜, UD(p˜)(p˜ω) < Umω(pω) for any p˜ < pˆ∗, a contradiction.
Case 3: |Z| > 1 and a(Dn) 	= a0. Suppose there exists a self-signaling set with |Z| > 1
and a(Dn) 	= a0. If Z =, then a(Dn)= a0 since there exists a simple expressive equi-
librium. Thus, consider the case where Z  and let ω(D) be ω such that a(Dn)= aω.
Then ω(D) ∈Z. Since |Z|> 1 and Z , we can always find ω′ ∈Z such that ω′ 	=ω(D)
and ω′′ /∈ Z. Then, by definition, for any p′ ∈ Q, UD(p′ω′) > Uσ(p′ω′)(p′ω′). On the
other hand, Uσ(p
′ω′′)(p′ω′′) = Uσ(p′ω′)(p′ω′) in any simple expressive equilibrium.
Then, since UD(p′ω′)=UD(p′ω′′), UD(p′ω′′) > Uσ(p′ω′′)(p′ω′′), a contradiction.
From Cases 2 and 3, there is no self-signaling set with |Z|> 1.
Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 6.
From Lemma 4, when a credible neologism exists in a simple expressive equilib-
rium, it always takes the form of [0 q) × {ω}, where q > pˆ∗. Let D(q) = [0 q) × {ω}
and e(q) = argmaxe∈E{y(e) −
∫
p<q c(ep;β)ψ(p)/(q)dp}. Moreover, let UD(q)(pω)
be the type (pω) supervisor’s payoff when the agent optimally responds to D(q), that
is, UD(q)(qω)= y(e(q)).
From the indifference condition of simple expressive equilibrium, UD(pˆ
∗)(pˆ∗ω) =
Umω(pˆ∗ω). Thus, UD(q)(qω) can be written as
UD(q)(qω)=Umω(pˆ∗ω)+
∫ q
pˆ∗
y ′(e(q′))e′(q′)dq′
Since e(q′) is the optimal effort level given D(q′), it satisfies the first-order condition:
y ′(e(q′))− 1
(q′)
∫ q′
0
c1(e(q
′)p;β)ψ(p)dp= 0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Then, by the implicit function theorem,
e′(q′)= −
ψ(q′)
(q′) [ 1(q′)
∫ q′
0 c1(e(q
′)p;β)ψ(p)dp− c1(e(q′)q′;β)]
y ′′(e(q′))− 1(q′)
∫ q′
0 c11(e(q
′)p;β)ψ(p)dp
 (1)
Since y ′′(e(q′))≤ 0 and c11(e(q′)p;β) > 0 for any p, the denominator of the right hand
side of (1) is strictly negative. On the other hand, since c12(ep;β) < 0, the numerator of
the right hand side of (1) is strictly positive. Thus, e′(q′) > 0.
Note that
1
(q′)
∫ q′
0
c1(e(q
′)p;β)ψ(p)dp− c1(e(q′)q′;β) < c1(e(q′)0;β)− c1(e(q′)1;β)
Since c1(e0;β)−c1(e1;β)= β[b1(e1)−b1(e0)], the numerator of the right hand side
of (1) converges to 0 as β goes to 0. Let el = argmaxe∈E{y(e)−C(e)}. Since el < e(q′) for
any q′ ≥ pˆ∗ and b11(ep) ≤ 0, the denominator of the right hand side of (1) is strictly
smaller than −C ′′(el) < 0 for any β ∈ (01]. Hence, for any  > 0, e′(q′) <  if β is suffi-
ciently small.
From the equilibrium condition, Um∅(qω) can be written as
Um∅(qω)=Umω(pˆ∗ω)+
∫ q
pˆ∗
U
m∅
1 (pω)dp
Since e(m∅ω) > el,
U
m∅
1 (pω)= y(e(m∅ω))− λy(e(m∅ n)) > (1− λ)y(el) > 0
Thus, if β is sufficiently small, UD(q)(qω)≤Um∅(qω) for any q′ ∈ [pˆ∗1]. That is, there
is no self-signaling set.
A.11 Proof of Fact 4
In simple expressive equilibrium, the equilibrium cutoff pˆ makes mω and m∅ indifferent
to the supervisor. In this setting, the indifference condition can be simplified to the
quadratic equation
pˆ2 + 2α(1+ λ)
β
pˆ− 2α(1+ λ)
β
+ λ
1− λ = 0
Note that the right hand side has the minimum value at pˆ = −α(1 + λ)/β < 0 when-
ever αβλ > 0. Then, since there is at most one solution with a positive value, the
equilibrium cutoff is unique whenever it exists. Since there exists a unique cutoff
type that solves the equation, the existence of a simple expressive equilibrium re-
quires λ < y(e0)/y(eλ). Since eλ = αλ + β/2 and e0 = α, λ < y(e0)/y(eλ) is simplified
to λβ/(2(1− λ2)) < α.
Turning to neologism proofness, if (∂/∂q)UD(q)(pω) ≤ Um∅1 (pω) for any q ≥ pˆ∗,
then UD(q)(pω) ≤ Um∅(pω) for any p ≥ pˆ∗ and the simple expressive equilibrium is
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neologism-proof. Observe that
U
m∅
1 (pω)= y(e(m∅ω))− λy(e(m∅ n)) > (1− λ)y(e˜)= α2(1− λ)+
α
2
(1− λ)β
Moreover, since e(q)= α+βq/2, UD(q)(pω)= α(α+βq/2). Thus,
∂
∂q
UD(q)(pω)= αβ
2

By inspection, if UD(q)q (pω) ≤ α2(1 − λ) + α/2(1 − λ)β, then λβ/(2(1 − λ)) ≤ α.
Since Um∅1 (pω) > α
2(1 − λ) + α/2(1 − λ)β, λβ/(2(1 − λ)) ≤ α implies UD(q)q (pω) <
U
m∅
1 (pω). Note that since λ ∈ (01), λβ/(2(1 − λ2)) > λβ/(2(1 − λ)). Thus, when-
ever there exists a simple expressive equilibrium, it satisfies the condition of neologism
proofness.
A.12 Neologism-proof equilibrium andmultiple simple expressive equilibria
Fact 6. If there are multiple simple expressive equilibrium outcomes, only those with the
highest cutoff type can be neologism-proof.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, let Um(pω|p) be the supervisor with (pω)’s
expected payoff from m given the simple expressive strategy with cutoff p. Let pˆ∗ be the
highest cutoff type of simple expressive equilibria.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium cutoff pˆ∗∗ such that pˆ∗∗ < pˆ∗. From the equi-
librium condition, Um∅(pˆ∗∗ω|pˆ∗∗) = Um∅(pˆ∗∗ω|pˆ∗∗) and Um∅(pˆ∗ω|pˆ∗) = Um∅(pˆ∗
ω|pˆ∗). Then, since limp→1Umω(pω|p) < limp→1Um∅(pω|p) while Umω(pω|p) and
Um∅(pω|p) are continuous in p, there exists p′ ∈ [pˆ∗∗ pˆ∗] such that Umω(p′ω|p′) >
Um∅(p′ω|p′). On the other hand, since Um∅(pω|p) >Um∅(pω|pˆ∗∗) for any p> pˆ∗∗,
Umω(p′ω|p′) > Um∅(p′ω|pˆ∗∗). Note that Umω(1ω|1) < Um∅(1ω|pˆ∗∗). Then, since
Umω(pω|p) and Um∅(pω|pˆ∗∗) are continuous in p, there exists p′′ ∈ (p′1) such that
Umω(p′′ω|p′′)=Um∅(p′′ω|pˆ∗∗).
Since Um∅(pω|pˆ∗∗) is strictly increasing in p whereas Umω(pω|p′′) is constant
in p, Umω(pω|p′′) > Um∅(pω|pˆ∗∗) for any p<p′′ and Umω(pω|p′′) < Um∅(pω|pˆ∗∗)
if p>p′′. Note that Umω(pω|p′′) is the same as the supervisor’s payoff from neologism
[0p′′)× {ω}. Hence, [0p′′)× {ω} is a self-signaling set. 
A.13 A related signaling game and the D1 equilibrium
Suppose M = A. Assume that the incompetent’s choice function is restricted so that
a(mn) = m. This transforms the current game into a costly signaling game with sin-
gle type p. In the fully directive equilibrium, the supervisor’s strategy is σ(pω) = aω.
On the other hand, in the simple expressive equilibrium, the supervisor’s strategy is
σ(pω)= aω if p< pˆ; σ(pω)= a0 if p> pˆ.
The simple expressive equilibria always passes the D1 criterion whenever it exists.
Thus, the question is whether the fully directive equilibrium passes the D1 criterion.
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Fact 7. The fully directive equilibrium fails the D1 criterion whenever the simple expres-
sive equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let
eω(μp) = argmax
e∈E
{
y(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p)dp
}
en(μp) = argmax
e∈E
{
λy(e)−
∫
p
c(ep)μp(p)dp
}

Then define the best response efforts to m given μp whose support is Q:
BR(Qm)=
⋃
{μp:supp(μp)=Q}
{(eω(μp) en(μp))}
By the restriction on a(mn), σ(pω)= aω for all (pω) in the fully directive equilib-
rium. To test whether the fully directive equilibrium passes D1, suppose that the super-
visor sends off-equilibrium message m= a0. Then define
Dp(ωa0) := {(eωen) ∈ BR(Pa0) : y(e˜) < py(eω)+ (1−p)λy(en)}
which is the set of best response efforts to a0 that makes the supervisor’s payoff strictly
higher than that in the fully directive equilibrium.
Since (eωen) ∈ BR(Pa0), eω > en if (eωen) ∈ Dp(ωa0). Hence, if (eωen) ∈
Dp(ωa0), then y(e˜) < p′y(eω) + (1 − p′)λy(en) for any p′ > p, that is, (eωen) ∈
Dp′(ωa0).
Now define
D0p(ωa0) := {(eωen) ∈ BR(Pa0) : y(e˜)= py(eω)+ (1−p)λy(en)}
If (eωen) ∈D0p(ωa0), then eω > en since (eωen) ∈ BR(Pa0). Thus, if y(e˜) = py(eω)+
(1 − p)λy(en), then y(e˜) < p′y(eω) + (1 − p′)λy(en) for any p′ > p, that is, (eωen) ∈
Dp′(ωa0). Therefore,
Dp(ωa0)∪D0p(ωa0)⊆Dp′(ωa0)
Then the D1 criterion requires that μp(p|a0) = 0 for any p < 1. Under the off-
equilibrium belief, the supervisor with a sufficiently high p has an incentive to send
m= a0; that is, the D1 criterion eliminates the fully directive equilibrium. 
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